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RETURNS TO PUBLIC INVESTMENTS 
IN AGRICULTURE WITH IMPERFECT 
DOWNSTREAM COMPETITION 
STEPHEN F. HAMILTON AND DAVID L. SUNDING 
A multiple-market framework is developed to measure the size and distribution of research 
benefits. The model considers an upstream raw product market and a downstream finished product 
market and allows for imperfect competition in the intermediary food-processing sector. A central 
conceptual result is derived: an increase in raw product output is a sufficient condition for cost- 
reducing innovations in the farm sector to increase social welfare. A special case of linear farm 
supply and isoelastic processing production functions reveals that necessary conditions for welfare 
to decrease are a convergent farm supply shift, an oligopsonistic upstream market configuration, 
and increasing returns-to-scale processing technology. 
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A basic goal of public agricultural research is 
to reduce the costs of farm production. To- 
ward this end, governments have invested 
considerable resources to improve basic sci- 
entific knowledge, develop novel technolo- 
gies, and facilitate the adoption of modern 
plant varieties and farming methods. Econo- 
mists have generally concluded that public in- 
vestments in agriculture have achieved re- 
markable success in lowering the marginal 
cost of farm production, due in large part to 
the effectiveness of land grant research and 
extension activities (Chavas and Cox, Coch- 
rane). As a result of these cost changes, public 
agricultural investments have been shown to 
yield impressive social rates of return in nu- 
merous studies (for a survey of this literature, 
see Alston, Norton, and Pardey). 
Several recent papers have shown that im- 
perfect competition in the downstream pro- 
cessing sector can affect both the size and the 
distribution of welfare changes. Dryburgh and 
Doyle consider the impact of technical in- 
novation in a multimarket study of the British 
dairy industry under alternate downstream in- 
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dustry conditions of monopoly, monopsony, 
and perfect competition and find that research 
gains are smaller under monopoly. Huang and 
Sexton measure market power in the Taiwan 
tomato processing industry and use conjec- 
tural elasticity parameters to compare returns 
to mechanical tomato harvesting with a 
benchmark case of perfect competition. Re- 
cently, in the most thorough treatment of these 
issues to date, Alston, Sexton, and Zhang use 
a linear model with fixed proportions pro- 
cessing technology to examine the effect of 
imperfect competition in a multimarket frame- 
work. Their essential finding is that imperfect 
competition, in particular an oligopsony con- 
figuration, has a significant effect on the dis- 
tribution of research benefits and a lesser im- 
pact on the corresponding total welfare 
change. 
The studies to date on research benefits in 
imperfectly competitive markets have gener- 
ally specified the effects of public research 
with parallel or proportional shifts in farm 
supply. The remaining possibility, that of con- 
vergent shifts, is an interesting omission in 
the literature. Convergent shifts, which make 
the farm supply function more inelastic, have 
been considered previously by Lindner and 
Jarrett in the competitive case; however, sup- 
ply shifts that increase the slope of the farm 
supply relation have particularly profound im- 
plications under oligopsony. 
Other economists have noted that down- 
ward shifts in farm supply can reduce raw 
product use and increase farm prices in oli- 
gopsonistic industries. In particular, Chen and 
Lent find that an increase in the slope of the 
farm supply function is a necessary condition 
for a downward farm supply shift to reduce 
industry output. Hamilton and Sunding derive 
a similar result for convergent supply shifts 
in long-run oligopsony equilibria and detail 
how farm innovation can affect downstream 
concentration and market power. Our analysis 
extends this research, while recasting some of 
its major insights, by considering a more gen- 
eral theoretic framework and addressing the 
social welfare implications of convergent 
shifts in farm supply. 
This article develops a framework for the 
measurement of research benefits that is more 
general than other analyses in the literature to 
date. We consider three extensions simulta- 
neously: (i) a wider variety of farm supply 
shifts, (ii) a general specification of demand 
and farm cost functions, and (iii) a nonde- 
generate food processing production function 
that allows for various parameterizations of 
returns to scale. The analysis leads to several 
fundamental observations regarding the mar- 
ginal welfare impacts of cost-reducing farm 
investments. When all markets are perfectly 
competitive, we show that a reduction in the 
cost of producing the status quo level of farm 
output is both a necessary and a sufficient 
condition for an increase in social welfare. 
Under conditions of imperfect competition, 
however, we uncover a result that underscores 
the importance of downstream market struc- 
ture: Social welfare can decrease even when 
innovation reduces the cost of producing the 
status quo level of farm output. We demon- 
strate that welfare can decrease in response 
to innovation that lowers farm production 
costs only if the farm supply shift is conver- 
gent and the upstream raw product market is 
characterized by oligopsony. Conversely, we 
also show that an increase in farm output is 
a sufficient condition for a cost-reducing farm 
supply shift to increase social welfare. 
In the final section, the general results of 
the model are made more transparent by con- 
sidering a special case of linear farm supply 
and isoelastic processing production technol- 
ogy. Another necessary condition emerges for 
public research to reduce social welfare in this 
case: the food processing technology must ex- 
hibit increasing returns to scale. Thus, the 
three modifications made here to the more 
usual methods of evaluating research benefits 
provide a significant conceptual payoff. 
The Model 
Consider an agricultural economy consisting 
of a raw product market and a finished product 
market. The model is comprised of three types 
of agents (farmers, processors, and consum- 
ers) and two markets (a raw product market 
among farmers and processors and a finished 
product market among processors and con- 
sumers). 
The processing industry is comprised of n 
firms. The raw product use of processor i is 
denoted xi and the total raw product use in 
the industry is X = Si,1 xi. Similarly, Yi rep- 
resents the output of a single processing firm 
and aggregate output of the finished product 
is Y = En= Yi. The production function of 
processor i is Yi = f(xi), where f (xi) > 0 and 
f '(xi) < O.1 The consumer price is given by 
the inverse demand function for the final prod- 
uct, P(Y), with Py(Y) < 0. The farm price is 
given by the inverse supply function for the 
raw product, W(X; 0), where 0 is a shift pa- 
rameter that represents the level of public ag- 
ricultural investment. The farm supply func- 
tion satisfies Wx(X; 0) > 0 and, without loss 
of generality, we denote a downward shift in 
farm supply by the condition W5(X; 0) < 0. 
Strategic interaction among processors in the 
model is described by the conjectural varia- 
tions parameters 8i = dYldyi and iy, = dXldxi, 
where 5i and y,i are assumed to be constant. 




ri(Xi; O) = P > fi(Xi) fi(xi) 
i=l 
- W(X; O)xi 
which is defined completely over the input 
choice of the firm, xi, and the exogenous pol- 
icy parameter, 0. Expression (1) has the fol- 
lowing first-order condition:2 
'We consider the case of a single input to make the effects of 
a farm supply shift more transparent. An extension to the case of 
multiple inputs would be relatively straightforward. 
2 For notational convenience, we drop all arguments from the 
equations. Industry derivatives are denoted with subscripts, while 
the individual output effect of a representative processor is denoted 
with a prime. 
(2) D(xio) Pf + 8ipf 'fi - W 
- YiWxxi = 0. 
The market equilibrium in the processing in- 
dustry is thus described by 4 + 2n equations: 
(3) (iD(xi; 0) = 0, 
(4) i = fi(xi), 
i = 1, 2, . . . , n 
i= 1, 2,....n 
(5) Y= E y 
i=1 
(6) X= Xi 
i=1 
(7) P = P(Y) 
(8) W= w(X; 0). 
The equilibrium is characterized completely 
by the solutions {xi, i = 1, 2, . . ., n} in equa- 
tion (3). That is, given the solutions in equa- 
tion (3), equation (4) determines {Yi, i = 1, 
2, ..., n}, equation (5) determines Y, equa- 
tion (6) determines X, and equations (7) and 
(8), respectively, define the market prices P 
and W. The comparative statics results for an 
exogenous shift in the parameter 0 are there- 
fore captured entirely by the solutions to equa- 
tion (3). 
Confining attention to symmetric proces- 
sor equilibria, equation (5) can be expressed 
as Y = ny and equation (6) can be expressed 
as X = nx. Substituting equations (5) and (6) 
in equation (3), making use of equations (4), 
(7), and (8), the first-order condition of a rep- 
resentative processor is 
(9) cI(x, n, 0) 
= P[nf(x)]f'(x) + 8Py[nf(x)]f'(x) 
X f(x) - W(nx) - yxWx(nx) = 0. 
Converting the conjectural variations param- 
eters into elasticity form, we obtain ~ = by/ 
Y and o = yx/X, where t, o E [0, 1], with a 
value of 0 representing competition and a val- 
ue of 1 representing monopoly and monop- 
sony conduct, respectively.3 
First-order condition (9) can be expressed 
compactly as 
3 The allowable degree of oligopoly power is limited in a model 
of imperfect competition by the condition that marginal revenue be 
positive. From first-order condition (9), this restriction implies K < 
(l/n). 
(10) Pf'6 = W 
where ) = (1 - tri)/(1 + oE) is an inverse 
measure of the processing market imperfec- 
tion, q = -P'YIP is the absolute value of the 
output elasticity (or price flexibility) of de- 
mand, and E = W'X/W is the output elasticity 
of supply. Smaller values of ) represent great- 
er departures from perfect competition.4 In the 
competitive case, a representative processor 
equates the marginal value product with the 
farm price in equation (10), whereas, in non- 
competitive environments, the price of the 
farm product is less than the value of its mar- 
ginal product in inverse proportion to the val- 
ue of ). 
In general, analytic solutions to equation 
(9) are not possible. The effect of an arbitrary 
farm supply shift on the market equilibrium 
is therefore described using the implicit func- 
tion theorem. Differentiating first-order con- 
dition (9) with respect to x, we have 
(11) (>x-- f"(P + ntPyf) 
+ n(f')2[(1 + P)Py +PPyf] 
- n[(l + w)Wx + XWx] < 0. 
Expression (11) is an industry equilibrium 
condition, which, in a linear economy with 
constant returns to scale, reduces to <x = 
-nfl, where fl = [(1 + P)Py + (1 + o)Wx] 
is as derived analytically by Alston, Sexton, 
and Zhang. 
The derivative of equation (9) with respect 
to 0 is =x -(Wo + oXWxo). Thus, in a market 
without oligopsony power, public research af- 
fects the first-order condition of a represen- 
tative processor solely through the level effect 
in the farm supply function, W0, which cor- 
responds, in the short run, to the change in 
the marginal cost of farming. In a noncom- 
petitive raw product market, public invest- 
ment also affects first-order condition (9) 
through the rotation effect, Wxo, or through 
changes in the slope of the farm supply func- 
tion. In the terminology of Lindner and Jarrett, 
the rotational effect of a downward shift is 
"convergent" when Wxo > 0, and it is "di- 
vergent" in the opposite case.5 The most com- 
4 Specifically, the value of ) ranges from 1 under competition 
to (1 - 'q)/(l + e) < 1 under conditions of joint monopoly and 
monopsony power. 
5 Note that we define these terms at the equilibrium point. Gen- 
erally, if the supply functions cross each other, the shift may be 
convergent for one range of values and divergent for another. 
mon supply shifts specified in empirical work 
are parallel shifts (W, < 0 and Wx= 0) and 
proportional shifts (W0 = Wx, X < 0). 
The effect of public investment on a rep- 
resentative processor's use of farm products 
is dxldO = 
-(O/(x. Using the aggregation 
condition (6), public investment changes raw 
product use in a symmetric processing indus- 
try as 
dX n(Wo + (oXWx) (12) d 
where the denominator is negative by the 
equilibrium condition (11). For the case of 
nonparallel shifts, expression (12) may be 
written as 
dX nXWx(E? + o) (13) - 
where e? = Wo/XWxo, the elasticity of the shift 
in farm supply, gives the proportional change 
in the level effect relative to the rotation effect 
of the farm supply shift. The shift elasticity 
may be interpreted in terms of changes in the 
marginal and average farm price. At the initial 
level of output, the marginal change in the 
farm price is Wx,, while the average change 
in the farm price is Wo/X. Thus, the shift elas- 
ticity is the ratio of changes in the average 
and marginal farm price at the initial equilib- 
rium point. If public research reduces the 
equilibrium farm price (i.e., W. < 0), the shift 
elasticity is positive for divergent shifts but 
negative for convergent shifts in farm supply. 
Farm output can decrease in response to 
public research only when the shift elasticity 
is negative. In expression (13), farm output 
increases in response to a parallel or divergent 
shift in farm supply, regardless of the form of 
competition, but decreases in response to a 
convergent shift if \jE < o.6 In the next sec- 
tion, our discussion reveals that the shift elas- 
ticity, or, more precisely, the sign of the ro- 
tation effect, Wxo, provides a relevant focus 
for the empirical investigation of research 
benefits in noncompetitive food processing 
environments. 
6 Chen and Lent derive a similar condition for a supply distur- 
bance to decrease raw product use under oligopsony. 
Sectoral Impacts of Public Research 
In this section, we describe the effect of an 
arbitrary farm supply shift on farm surplus, 
processor surplus, and consumer surplus un- 
der various industry configurations in the pro- 
cessing sector. We first analyze the effect of 
public research on farm surplus and, in par- 
ticular, on changes in the total cost of farming 
associated with agricultural innovation. 
At the initial equilibrium point, the total 
variable cost of farm production is 
x(o) 
(14) TC(X; 0) = W(Z, 0) dZ 
which implies that public research changes 
total farm production costs as follows: 
dX fx (15) TCO = W- + Wo(Z, 0) dZ. dO 
The first term after the equality in equation 
(15) is the change in production costs asso- 
ciated with the change in output, while the 
integral represents the change in the cost of 
producing the status quo level of output. That 
is, the integrand gives the distance between 
the initial and postresearch farm supply 
curves. Given that the intent of public re- 
search is to lower farm production costs, we 
confine attention to the case where the integral 
in equation (15) has a negative value, thereby 
eliminating from consideration public invest- 
ments that increase the total cost of producing 
the status quo level of output.7 Even with such 
a restriction, the effect of public research on 
farm production costs is potentially ambigu- 
ous: the cost of producing the ex ante output 
level declines but more units may be produced 
ex post. 
In the empirical examination of research 
benefits, perhaps the greatest challenge is to 
measure the change in production costs along 
the entire length of the initial supply curve. 
In principle, this change is measurable if the 
functional form of the farm supply curve and 
the type of shift are known. Alternatively, it 
is also possible to estimate the change in the 
supply relation nonparametrically, using the 
7 Notice, however, that our methodology extends quite readily 
to other interventions, such as environmental regulations, that in- 
crease the total cost of farm production. 
microparameter method described by Sund- 
ing.8 
We next examine the effect of public re- 
search on farm surplus. Farm surplus is given 
as 
X(o) 
FS(O) W(X, O)X - W(Z, 0)dZ. 
It follows that the effect of public investment 
on farm surplus is 
dFS= WxX I- + WoX dO \dO/ 
rx 
- Wo(Z, ) dZ. 
fo 
The effect of public research on farm surplus 
in equation (16) is ambiguous and depends on 
supply and demand conditions, the number of 
processing firms, the nature of competition in 
the processing industry, and the level and ro- 
tation effect of the shift in farm supply. For 
the case of a parallel supply shift, the last two 
terms cancel in equation (16) and farm surplus 
increases if and only if raw product use in- 
creases. From equation (12), raw product use 
always increases in response to a parallel shift, 
whereupon farm surplus unambiguously in- 
creases, regardless of the degree of structural 
competitiveness in the processing industry. 
For a divergent shift, the value of W0 is greater 
at the equilibrium point than at lower output 
levels, which implies that the sum of the last 
two terms in equation (16) is negative. Thus, 
farm surplus can decline even when raw prod- 
uct use increases if public investment induces 
a divergent shift of farm supply. For a con- 
vergent shift, the value of W. is smaller at the 
equilibrium point than at lower levels of out- 
put, and the sum of the last two terms in equa- 
tion (16) is positive. Hence, an increase in 
raw product output is sufficient for an increase 
in farm surplus following a convergent shift. 
Notice, however, that raw product use can de- 
cline in equation (12) for a convergent shift 
under conditions of oligopsony. With an oli- 
gopsonistic upstream raw product market, the 
change in farm surplus following a convergent 
8 This method decomposes the initial supply curve into its con- 
stituent regional components (e.g., each point on the supply curve 
corresponds to production costs in a defined region) and calculates 
changes in production costs for each region as a function of changes 
in crop yields and per acre production costs. 
shift depends on the relative magnitudes of 
the changes in farm output and farm produc- 
tion costs. 
These findings relate to the empirical lit- 
erature on changes in farm surplus under per- 
fect competition. In the perfectly competitive 
case, equation (16) implies that a necessary 
condition for farm surplus to decrease is that 
the farm supply shift is divergent, a familiar 
result to studies that specify proportional farm 
supply shifts in the measurement of research 
benefits. 
Processor surplus is defined as PS(0) 
P[Y(O)]Y(0) - W(X; O)X(O). Differentiation 
of the processor surplus measure with respect 
to 0 yields 
dPS (P+ p (dY d- = (P + PyY) ) -W5X 
~do =e ~d 
- (W + W,X) 
Making use of the first-order condition (9) and 
the relationship dY/dO = f'(dX/dO), it follows 
that 
dPS (17) e = [f'PyY(1 - ) - WxX(1 - o)] 
(dX 
In the case of joint monopoly and monopsony 
in the processing industry, the first term is 
zero by the envelope theorem, and public in- 
vestment unambiguously increases processor 
surplus. For all other industry configurations, 
expression (17) indicates that the change in 
output affects processor surplus, as the first 
term in equation (17) has the opposite sign of 
dXldO. Thus, a contraction of raw product use 
is a sufficient condition for the farm supply 
shift to increase processor surplus. If raw 
product use increases in response to the shift, 
such as in the case of a parallel farm supply 
shift, the effect of public investment on pro- 
cessor surplus is determined by two counter- 
vailing factors. The downward shift in farm 
supply directly increases processor surplus 
through the last term in equation (17). How- 
ever, the shift also affects processor surplus 
through the first term in equation (17), as an 
increase in aggregate raw product use increas- 
es the equilibrium price of the raw product 
and decreases the equilibrium price of the fin- 
ished product. This latter effect is stronger 
when oligopoly and oligopsony power is 
small and when the farm supply shift is di- 
vergent.9 
Consumer surplus is defined as 
Y(O) 
CS(O) J P(Z) dZ - P[Y(O)]Y(0). 
Differentiation with respect to 0 yields dCSI 
dO = 
-PyY(dYldO). Making the substitution 
dY/dO = f'(dX/dO), we have 
dCS =dXf (18) dO - = P (d 
The change in consumer surplus has the same 
sign as the change in raw product use in equa- 
tion (12). This result indicates once again the 
importance of the term Wx, in determining the 
distribution of research benefits in noncom- 
petitive environments. Under perfect com- 
petition in the processing industry, consumer 
surplus increases for any downward shift in 
farm supply, regardless of the rotation effect, 
as competitive processors expand raw product 
use in response to the shift. In noncompetitive 
processing environments, public research in- 
creases consumer surplus when the farm sup- 
ply shift is parallel or proportional, but im- 
miserates consumers for convergent shifts that 
induce a contraction of raw product use in 
equation (12). 
Public Research and Social Benefits 
Social benefit, the sum of consumer, proces- 
sor, and farm surplus, is given by 
Y(9) rX(0) 
SB(0)- P(Z)dZ - W(Z; 0) dZ. 
Differentiating social benefit with respect to 
0 and simplifying yields 
9 The analysis of processor surplus in the competitive case pro- 
vides an interesting point of comparison between our approach and 
the case of fixed proportions production technology. The specifica- 
tion of a fixed input-output ratio in the processing sector restricts 
marginal profit to be zero under perfect competition, which rules out 
the possibility of fixed costs. Our choice of a more general production 
function leaves open the possibility that competitive processors earn 
positive profits in a short-run equilibrium and/or that fixed costs exist 
in the processing sector. 
dSB (dX 
_ (19) d- = (Pf' -W)- -I WH(Z;0)dZ. dO (9)dO 
In response to public innovation, social ben- 
efit increases in equation (19) following an 
expansion of raw product use and a decrease 
in the status quo costs of farm production. In 
a competitive food processing environment, 
the marginal value product of farm output 
equals the raw product price by first-order 
condition (9), which implies that the change 
in social benefit is equal to the reduction in 
total farm production costs at the initial equi- 
librium point. Thus, under conditions of per- 
fect competition, a reduction in farm produc- 
tion costs at the initial equilibrium point is 
both a necessary and a sufficient condition for 
public research to increase social benefit.10 
When the processing sector is imperfectly 
competitive, equation (19) uncovers a fun- 
damental result in public research: social wel- 
fare can decrease if dX/dO < 0. Thus, from 
equation (12), a perverse welfare result can 
emerge only in the case of a convergent farm 
supply shift. 
This point is particularly interesting given 
the typical specifications of supply functions 
employed in empirical models of research 
benefits. Consider, for example, the following 
commonly specified inverse supply functions: 
W(X, O) = 0 + aX 
W(X, ) = a + OX 
W(X, ) = 0(a + 1X) 
W(X, 0) = ox" 
W(X, 0) = aXX 
W(X, o) = (OX) 
where dO < 0 for a downward shift. Each of 
these functions precludes the possibility that 
Wxo > 0, and thus rule out, a priori, the type 
of effects that result from convergent shifts; 
these include a potential contraction of in- 
dustry output and a concomitant decrease in 
social welfare. 
Lindner and Jarrett and others have rec- 
ognized the potential for public research to 
induce convergent farm supply shifts. The 
types of innovations most likely to result in 
convergent shifts are those that lower the costs 
of producing the status quo level of farm out- 
'o This result also appears in Sunding. 
put but increase the share of fixed costs in the 
crop budget. These changes reduce farm costs 
while simultaneously making the farm supply 
function less elastic. Indeed, one of the most 
celebrated analyses of research benefits al- 
ludes to just such an outcome. In their 1970 
analysis of research benefits for the mechan- 
ical tomato harvester in California, Schmitz 
and Seckler find that adoption of the harvester 
reduced harvest labor requirements and var- 
iable production costs while increasing fixed 
costs. Subsequently, Just and Chern conclud- 
ed that the adoption of the tomato harvester 
made the farm supply relation more inelastic 
and, hence, resulted in a convergent shift." 
The Case of Linear Supply and Isoelastic 
Production Technology 
The methodological approach we have out- 
lined employs general specifications of sup- 
ply, demand, and processor production rela- 
tionships. A special case of this framework, 
therefore, is the linear economy with fixed 
proportions processing technology pursued by 
Alston, Sexton, and Zhang. In this section, we 
present a special case that extends their anal- 
ysis but which leads to quite different con- 
clusions. In particular, we follow Alston, Sex- 
ton, and Zhang by specifying a linear farm 
supply curve but consider a more general, is- 
oelastic food production technology. We also 
maintain a more general demand function, 
though this difference is of little import. The 
implication of the special case is that alter- 
native specifications of the downstream pro- 
duction technology produce results that are 
fundamentally different from the case of fixed 
proportions, which clarifies an important and 
heretofore unrecognized role of scale econo- 
mies in the processing sector. The results un- 
derscore our earlier observation that the re- 
lationship between farm supply shifts and re- 
search returns is considerably richer than pre- 
viously recognized. 
For analytic convenience, we consider a 
linear farm supply function and confine at- 
tention to the case of a competitive down- 
'' We should emphasize that the adoption of the tomato harvester 
increased social welfare, because the large downward-level effect of 
the farm supply curve dominated the rotation effect of the convergent 
shift. The point is, rather, that convergent shifts are an empirical 
possibility. 
stream finished products market.12 As in the 
previous section, inverse demand is P(Y), 
while the farm supply function is given by 
(20) W(X; 0) = b(O) + P(O)X, 
where the slope and intercept of the supply 
function, 3(0) and b(0) respectively, are, at 
least potentially, affected by public research. 
At an initial equilibrium point, X*, we can 
completely characterize a downward vertical 
shift in farm supply by the condition Wo(X*) 
= be + P,X* < 0, while a rotation effect in 
the farm supply function is captured by the 
condition Wxo = 30. Familiar supply shifts in 
empirical research include the parallel down- 
ward shift, which satisfies bq < 0 and P, = 
0, and the proportional divergent (or pivotal) 
shift, which satisfies b, = 0 and P, < 0. The 
other possibility we consider is that of a con- 
vergent shift, which is characterized by the 
ons be < 0, Pe > 0, and b, + P3X* < 0. 
The technology of a representative pro- 
cessor is given by the following isoelastic pro- 
duction function: 
(21) y = f(x) = Axa 
where xo is the production elasticity. For al- 
ternative values of the production elasticity, 
equation (21) reduces to various processing 
situations associated with increasing returns 
to scale (a > 1), decreasing returns to scale 
(a < 1), and fixed proportions (ar = 1). 
Using equation (20), the first-order con- 
dition (9) becomes 
(22) = Pf' - b- 3b(1 + o)X= 0. 
By equation (11), the equilibrium condition is 
(23) cx = Pf" + nPy(f')2 - np(l + w) < 0. 
For isoelastic production technology (21), 
substituting f' = aof/x and f" = (oa - 1)f'I 
x in equation (23) and simplifying yields 
(24) (x = T/x < 0 
where T = {Pf'[a(l - q1) - 1] - 3X(1 + 
12 These specifications do not qualitatively affect the results de- 
scribed below. The objective here is to examine research returns in 
an analytically convenient multimarket framework, the simplest of 
which combines a generalized production function in the processing 
industry with a competitive market-clearing condition in the down- 
stream finished product industry. 
o))}. Applying the implicit function theorem 
to equation (22), we obtain 
dX 
_ X[b, + P1X(1 + o)] (25) O dO 
From equation (20), the total cost of farm pro- 
duction is the area under the supply function 
rx 
TC(X) = (b + PZ) dZ. 
fo 
Hence, in response to public innovation, the 
change in the total cost of producing the status 
quo level of farm output is 
(26) f Wo(Z, 0) dZ = (b0X2 + 0X2)/2. 
fo 
In equation (26), the total cost of producing 
the status quo level of farm output decreases 
for a convergent shift in farm supply (P, ' 
0), as (b, + P0X/2) < (b, + 0OX) < 0. Total 
farming costs also decrease for a parallel or 
proportional farm supply shift, although a di- 
vergent shift that reduces the equilibrium farm 
price may increase the cost of producing the 
status quo level of farm output. This result 
occurs if b0 > 0 and -foX/2 < bo < - ,. 
Substituting equation (25) and equation 
(26) into equation (19) for the change in social 
benefit yields 
dSB (27) = X{2opX[b, + PeX(1 + o)] dO 
- '(2b0 + P,X)}/24 
where the denominator is negative by equa- 
tion (24). In a competitive environment, equa- 
tion (27) reduces to dSB/dO = -X(bo + eoX/ 
2), which is positive for a cost-decreasing 
farm supply shift, as in the general model. It 
follows directly that public research reduces 
social benefit only in the case of an upstream 
oligopsony configuration and a convergent 
farm supply shift. 
Evaluating equation (27) at the equilibrium 
point and substituting the definitions W0 = b0 
+ P3X* and Wxo = P3, yields, after some sim- 
plification, 
dSB 
(28) dH = WoX[2(WoX - t) dO 
+ E0(2Wo2pX + T)]/2T 
where the shift elasticity, E0, is as described 
in the previous section. Inspection of equation 
(28) reveals that public research increases so- 
cial benefit when the term in square brackets 
is positive. The first term in this bracket is 
positive by equation (24). Thus, for a con- 
vergent shift of farm supply (e < 0), social 
welfare can only decrease when the shift elas- 
ticity is relatively large (in absolute value) and 
when market circumstances satisfy the in- 
equality T + 2(()223X* > 0. Substitution of 
T reveals that a necessary condition for a per- 
verse welfare effect to occur in equation (28) 
is 
(29) Pf'[a(l - n) - 1] 
> PX*[(l - 02) + (1 - o)]. 
Noting that o - 1, it follows immediately that 
the right-hand side of equation (29) is (at least 
weakly) positive. Therefore, necessary con- 
ditions for a convergent farm supply shift to 
reduce social benefits are o > 0 and xa(l - 
ql)> 1. 
The implication of the special case is that 
a convergent farm supply shift can reduce so- 
cial welfare only when the processing tech- 
nology satisfies a > 1, which corresponds to 
a situation of increasing returns to scale in the 
food processing industry. Moreover, the range 
of circumstances in which public research 
yields negative social returns increases with 
the value of a. This finding highlights the po- 
tential quantitative and qualitative bias in the 
calculation of social benefits when a degen- 
erate processing production function is spec- 
ified in food processing environments that are 
not, in fact, characterized by constant returns 
to scale. 
Conclusion 
This article develops a general framework for 
calculating of the size and distribution of re- 
search benefits. The framework distinguishes 
between the farm product and final product 
markets with a processing production func- 
tion, employs general supply and demand 
functions, and considers broad classes of farm 
supply shifts. 
The results reinforce the importance of as- 
sumptions about competitive conditions and 
the specification of supply shifts when mea- 
suring the size and distribution of research 
benefits. In particular, when the downstream 
processing industry is imperfectly competi- 
tive, the welfare implications of cost-reducing 
innovation are sensitive to changes in the 
slope of the farm supply relation. Public in- 
vestment that lowers the total cost of farming 
always increases aggregate welfare under per- 
fect competition but may actually reduce wel- 
fare for convergent shifts when the down- 
stream food processing industry is imper- 
fectly competitive. 
The nature of food processing technology 
is also important. A special case of the model 
reveals that necessary conditions for public 
research to result in perverse welfare changes 
is an oligopsony upstream market configura- 
tion and increasing returns to scale in the pro- 
cessing industry. The potential for substantial 
scale economies in the highly concentrated 
food processing sector favors the implemen- 
tation of more general farm supply shifts and 
more flexible processor production relation- 
ships in future analyses of research benefits. 
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